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A well-known problem in intercultural studies is the imposition of one's own
cognitive and evaluative dispositions on the actors obsen'ed. ,\ccorcling t()
structuralist and constructir-ist common sense, everybody makes distinctions such as
'cooked vs. raw', 'tich vs. poor', 'free vs. dominated' etc. in order to organize his ot'
her cognitive and pracncal univetse. Such distinctions extend from insignificant,
ordinary habits to important markers of individual and collective identity. In tl-re casc
of religious convictions, such distinctions (such as 'saved vs. not saved', 'Gocl vs.
Devil', 'niwana vs. affliction' etc.) are normally very important for the actors observecl
and for their observers. Although researchers m^y or may not be religious, they will
rìevertheless always have a cerÍiln standpoint on religion in general andf or certain
specific religious practices. Thus, implicit or hidclen cognitive and emotional
dispositions will structure the way they construct their objects of observation, what
they see and how they interptet theit findings.
I will sketch the problem briefly. The method presented in this article was
developed for a large research project on Pentecostals in the counter-insurgency war
during the mid-eighties in Guatemâla and Nicaragua. In my first fìeld study I had
noted that Pentecostals tended to enforce discipLine in qutte a rigid way. A female
member of the Assemblies of God explained, '\Well, the Assemblies of God have a
very hard and jealous order. If we Christians want to be saved, we have to obey
stdctly.'With my Lutheran dispositions, which d,rstinguish 'Law vs. Gospel', 'coercion
vs. freedom', I perceived such statements as markers of 'lawful' theology and 'unfree'
religious ptactice. \W4rat happened here was that my perception was being structured
by dispositions that were important to my own practice but not to the practice of the
actors observed. Any perception is distinction, and the basic distinction þetween
'Law and Gospel'in our case) is like the 'bLind spot'in the retina, which makes vision
possible but cannot see itself and can only'be made visible in an experiment (see
Luhmann 1991: 62; MarwanafYarela 1992; Schäfer 2002). That is, the basic
distinction wotks as an implicit preconception that makes obsewation possible at the
price of structuring reahty in a certain way.
A first and commonly-known answer to the problems of 'preconceptions' in the
processes of comprehension has been provided by Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975).
Hermeneutic philosophy seeks to make preconceptions visible by reflecting on them.
This is a flecessâry fitst step. Flowever, the ptoblem is mote deeply rooted. Simple
reflection may bring an awareness of the problem as such, but it does flot guârântee
the identification of the dispositions that reaþ shape the perception. In addition, as
Luhmann puts it, in ordet to make a perceptional distinction visible, it is necessary to
establish another 
- 
invisible 
- 
distinction, and so forth. In this way we fall into an
endless tegtession, ancl thus, the problem cannot be solved in a categotical or
principled way. Instead, it has to be dealt with by methodological measures.
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1. Basic guidelines
Durìng my held work, I cliscussed the observauonal problem with my wife, an
anthropologist' N7e saw that a first diffìculty arises from aÀ analysis that does not rakeinto account the context in which the practices and interpret^i... .o.r..pts are being
'used' flWittgenstein). But this does not say much. Anothàr diffìculty 
^tises *h"n thãcategories basic to thc major distinctìon emploved in the ,"r.^..h are too closcly
telated to those that structure the practice of the actors observed. It is not a good ideâ
to study religious practices using a tesearch tool based on a distinction oireJigious
terms. Thus, we concluded that it would be best to consrruct a research toof that
would be as formal as possible and capable of capturing the practical processes of the
people obserwed, allowing us to reconstruct how p.opt. 
-ãk. ....r.., (À4ax Weber:
"\'inn) 
of what they think and do. First of aJl, a fàrmal, or at least a non_religious,
instrument would allow us to observe whether teligion wâs at all important få tf.r.âctors' Second, the instrument would rìot interfere too much with the actors'
narradves of their teJigious practices in open interviews. Thi-tcl, it would faciltate the
combination of interview analysis with observations and other data leading to rhe
reconstruclion and interpretation of the actors, practices. A formal model,
nevertheless, shouid not adhere to structuralist binarism, quasi-metaphysical concep;
of 'symbolic forms' or 'symbol systems', but should sÀo* ho*- people g.rr.å,.
practtcal seflse as â sense for their praxis (Bourdieu). So, fourth, ã model" should
enable researchers to structure the processes by which actors generate â sense for theit
praxis. And fifth, since we are tryrng to urìderstand alien pt^.ir i.r its social context,
the instrument should also be actton-related antl provid. 
^ 
i^y to relate the findings to
the surrounding social structure; it should be a model foi analyzing praxis in" the
.A.ristoteLian (bios) and Marxian (Theses against Feaerbach) sense of the word. Thus the
tnoclel presented in the following is based on the presupposition thâr in order to
r'rndcrstand alien practice, it is necessary to esiablisÀ- formal, action-oriented
clistinctions to guide the observation.
'I'he model is based upon the sociology of pierre Bourdieu, namely upon his
thcory of practical logìc, framed by the concepts of habirus and social ,pr.á u.'*.11 ,s,
to a certain exrent only, by the theory of fìelds (see Bourdieu 2000, 1gi6, rgg0, 1977,
1971, 197Ia; Bourdieu/wâcquant 1992; also Schäfer 2006, 2005a, 2005b, 2003 (with
literature on social mo\¡ement research), 1998). As pentecostalism is u ..ligror.,
movement, approaches of social movement research have been taken into accãunt,both identity-oriented and strategy-oriented strarìds. Most imporranr for this
publication, howevet, âre the methods borrowed from French struèturalists Âþrdas
Julien Greimas and François Rastier (Gteimas 1995; Greimas/Rastier 1970). ihese
were helpful in developrng the model of the 'praxeological square, using Bourdieu's
theory of practical logic, which functions as the cente.pi... fà. a nerwork model of
practical operators.l The square serwes first as the basic model of an analvncal method
I 
'{)perators', according to mv understanding (and close to the late \X/ittgenstein), are elements
of social relations (incìuding semantics) like statements, actions, signs,-things etc. that exert
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for teconstructing the pnctical dispositions of inten'iewees and second âs the
empitical'gtoundwork' for u theory of 'Identity as a Network' (Schâfer 2005a)' The
former wilibe the focus of this paper. The undedying empirical reseatch took piace in
Guatemala and Nicaragua in 1983, 1985 and 1986. Over a period of two years I
conducted 195 open interviews, taped 100 sefmons' took minutes on some 120
services and kept a fielcl cliary of obserwations. For this studlr i¡ is importânt to note
that the religious actofs wefe stron€lly polarized according to the polatizanon of the
overall ,o.i^l .p".. in waf-torn and crisis-ridden Guatemala. Thus, the most
instructive .^-pì., we tefer to ate, on the one hand, Pentecostal groups in the
traditional lowãr classes, and, on the othef, Neo-Pentecostal groups in the
modernizing upper-middle classes (see Schäfer 2006). Over a very short period of
dme and 
""¿.i the pressure of social polarizanon, these gloups deveioped verydifferent relìgious styles despite the fact that they refer to a common set of religious
symbols. Nãvertheless, in this article our focus lies not on the impact of social class
on religious praxis. Rather the examples here serve to show that in intercultural
,.r."r.É a fårmal, action-oriented and non-teltgorts instfument for the study of
reJigious actors helps, fifst, to avoid content-oriented presuppositions and, second,
.nÃ1., the researcher to derect and reconstruct very different kinds of religious praxis
even though the actors at stake use the same inventoty of reJigious signs and symbols
(and werJwidely described by obserwers as having the same reLigious style. In the
foÌlowing, we will focus exclusively on the method.
2.Ttre praxeological square - basic fotm
As we are looking for a formaT model, basic relations of forrnal logrc seem to fìt our
needs most ."^.tly. Three basic relations of Aristotelian logic have long been used to
structure the logical syllogism: impLication, contraries and contradictories. These basic
relations are cultutally universal, since in any cultute people know the telations of
causality (rain impLies wet stfeets), of difference @reen vefsus blue) and of mutual
exclusion (light vèrsus datkness).2 During late Antiquity and the eadv Nliddle Ages,
these relatiofls were orgatizeð. into the so-called syllogistic squâre. This model was
fficts t1pon those relations. I{owever, an operator is nothing without the relations in whicb it
ãp.to,.r(e.g.,intheexpression'y-(a)x'Qisaof x)¿istheoPerâtorwhichrelatesTancl .r'in
a-specific wãy). -{ sratemenr such as 'We are living in the end-times' is not simply a rcligìotrs
,igÀ or symbol, and even less is it the signifìcation of a factual condition. Âbove all it is a social
of.r"roi that implies certain ways of perception, judgments, actions and, thereforc, socill
relations.
2There is a discussion as to whether the Âristotelian 1aw of non-contradiction is valid since in
Asian logic supposedly 'Â' can be 'B' as well. Nevertheless, it should be taken into account
whether we âre talking about 'Á.' being 'B' in regard to a certain âspect, perspective or context.
In such a case, rhe difference between 'European' and 'Asian' ways of thinking are no longer
so grave. Darkness can be light for a European mystic as well; however, this kind of religious
."p-..i.n.. makes sense onÌy within the framework that the ttorua/ or genera/ relatton between
light and clarkness is one of mutual exclusion.
H. Schäfer
adapted by Gremias and Rastier (1970) to analyze'deep structures of the semanric
universe'. The squar:e, âs the two French structurâlists use it, describes the constraints
according to which meaning is procluced. The square is made up of terms (,\, ts, Non-
A and Non-B) which are linked to one anorher b), three relations: corrtta;ry (A to B),
implication (A to Non-B) and contradiction (A to Non-A). The S-axis (contrary) is
'neutral', so thar the terms have an 'either-or' relation. The S-axis3 (sub-contrary) is
'complex', so that the terms have an 'as well as' relation. Then, the relations of
implication are named deixis. The first deixis (A and Non-B) is defìned as positive; the
second @ and Non-A) as negative. Irrnally, the transverse relatìons (A to Non-A, B to
Non-B), the 'schemata', àre contradictory. For the deep structures of the semantic
universe, the model shows that meaning is constituted by difference and logical
transformation. To put it simply: to go from 'active' to 'passive', logic has to pass over
'non-active'. Greimas and Rastier use the model to describe the semantic universe of
gender relations in France. Thus, the¡, disunguish, in positive deixis, 'matrimonial
þrescribed)' and 'normal (not forbidden)' relations as 'allowed' from the relations in
negative deìxis as 'excluded': 'abnormal (forbidden)' and 'non-matrimonial (not
presctibed)'. The model helps in understanding the logic undedying the cultural
systems of meaning. But it is not yet suitable for understanding the social processes of
'making sense' of one's practices (and thus constitutrng 'praxis).
The semiotic square according to Greimas/Rastier
S-axis
Non A
complex
S-axis (Non S-axis)
* = lmplication
= Contrariness
H 
= Contradiction
Diagram 1: Semiotic square according to Greirnas and Rastier
3 Non-S, non-Â and non-B will be referred to as $', 'rV and B'.
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The model has to be transformed if it is to be used in sociological analysis. For
sociology, especially in a Bourdieuian/Wittgensteinian framework, it is not the semantic
universe as such that is of interest, but rather the actors' use of signs, sigrufication and
meaning. Signs are themselves not (pfimarily) representations, but operatots of
perception, judgement and action. As operators they orgatize the interpretation of
experience in the sense that interpretation is already operative in the basic act of
perception. ,\t the same time, experienced objective circumstances Qegal institutions,
the polìce, the distribution of material goods, social recognition combined with the
access to certain social places etc.) are not only social 'hardware', but also function as
signs televant for human pfactices and not only as theit obiective conditions.
Praxeolog ical sq uare: cog n it¡ve transformations
Axis of clear-cut ascriptions and explanatìons
lnterpretation lnterpretation
(negat¡ve) (A) (negative) {B)
Levelof
expenence Pos¡tive
Experience {El
Negative
Experieilce {Ai
Axis of complex coniexis of action
Epistenric transformation
Action oriented transformaiion
Diagram 2: Praxeolo gic al s quare : co gnitive transformations
Workrng with Bourdieu's theory of practical logic, the squâre can be transformecì
for sociological use. For this pulpose I drstinguish terms for the description of
experience (A and B) from other terms (A and B) for the interþretation (Deutunþ of
experierìce. Thus, the model has one term each for negative and positive experience as
well as for negative and positive interpretation. Moreover, the model will be read not
so much Like a static structlrre of meaning but like a structured process of
transformation. The transformative process runs through all the terms, generâting
sense by interpreting expefience 
- 
that is, ascribing meaning to practices (as \7eber
would say). In its sociological use, the model allows for two perspectives of analysis.
I
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Examinìng the mere cognitive operators, it helps us to understand the basic cognitive
transformations thât operate in the deep structure of praclcal logic. l)rawing
conclusions about dispositions of habitus, the moclel aliows us (within the limit that
'disposition' is not subject to obserwation [R. Carnap]) to understand cenrral
operations of identity- and strategy-formation among the actofs observed.
The following appìication of the model focr,rses on social movements. we
understand, correspondingly, the terms of the square according to the specìfìc forms
of practice in this fìeld. This meâns that, for exâmple, the term for 'negative
experience' (A) is being described as'rìsìs', since social movements, according to New
Social Movement theory, reacf to 'grievances'. Negative experience, however, must be
coded appropriately, according to the fìeld of practice examined in a given research
project. The same is the case for any other term.4
Praxeologlcalsquare: generailon of ldenfity and strategy
,\xrs of cogftitive elaboration oi experience
Level of
inle, preldtíot¡
Solut¡ons.
alliances (A)
Articulated
Problems,
grievances (A)
of cognition
I
I
Negat¡ve
c orrrlitiorrs.
adYersaries
(Bl
Level ol
experrcnce Pos¡t¡on of the
movement. base
for strateg¡es (Ð
Axis cf f eldorientated eleboration
+ ldentitY
Strategy
Diagram 3: Praxeological square: generation of identity ând strategy
The basic use of the model is to strucrurc cognitiue operatìons.In this regatd, it helps to
understand the creation and ttansformation of meaning as â way in which actors
process their experiences cogrìltively and generâte perspectives of action. Accordingly
the model allows us to capture two transformations: an epistemic and an action-
I
I
a This mcans, for guided interwiews, simply that four questions
have to be formulated in correspondence with specific negatir.e
interpretations in the fteld of interest.
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oriented one. Both trânsformations operate under the axiomatic dichotomy between
'positive' and 'negative intefpretation' ('A. and B), which is to say that clear cut
ascripuons and explanations interpret complex contexts of experience and action. The
Eutinic transþrmation accounts for the fact that experience is already being classifìed
and assessed during the very actof perception. In the model, this corresponds to the
transformation between'negative experience' l.A), 'positive interpretation' (or: reasons
for positive expefience, A) and 'positive expefieflce' @). Petcepuon, iudgement and
self-positioning, thus, can be understood as one, albeit differenciated, epistemic âct.
Correspondingly, the aclion-oriented trantþrnatìon @ to B and B to A) accounts for the
fact that an actor's concepts of actions not onþ are being molded by his opportunities
and constraints, but also by perception and evaluation of experience. Moteover, the
model implies that the pfocesses of structurìng experience by perception and of
designtng action can be understood as homological.
For social movement theory the relation between â movement's identi\ ønd strateg
is an important sociological issue. In this reg rd, the model can be read as a process by
which actors, in our case religious movements, position themselves within their
perceived social context and, thus, develop identities ând strategies. (Collective) actors
articulate grievances (A), imagine and formulate solutions (,\) for the causes of the
grievances @), and affirm their position @), e.g. as a religious movement' This
pro..r. of interpretation and self-ascription allows for a 'cognitive elaboration of
èxperience' in order to find a position in the fìeld of action and an identifl as a social
acior þosition B). Moving further from this position, the actors are modeled as
developing rtratugies to cope with the 'structutal conditions' and 'advetsaries' (B) that
.^.rr. ih.i. 'grievances' (A). The model thus articulates dispositions of perception and
judgment as conditioning the design of strategies, which is to say that strategies are
embedded in identity. Nevertheless, the model does not exclude the possibiliqt of a
strategic calculus in a principled way.
From both perspectives , that of cognition as well as that of identity and strategy,
the model allows us to structure the logic of the ttansformanonaf processes of
ascribing meaning, valued positively or negatively, to experience and ac¡ton. In both
perspectives, the model distinguishes a level (or, according to Greimas, an 'axis') of
èxperience from a level (or 'axis) of interpretation. The distinction between these
levels is important in undetstanding the transforrnation which takes place by ascribing
meaning to expefience and action. Meaning 
- 
ideas, 'symbolic systems' etc. 
- 
is by n<>
means a simple mirror of 'reality' ßotty 1999). Meaning is itself an oþerator in human
practice. It does not simply fepfesent stâtes of pracice, but, by virtue of being 'usecl'
by humans for ascription of attribution, it becomes 'instrumental' (in a
V/ittgensteinian sense), that is to say, apracttcù oPerator. This is how meaning comes
to terms with the process of interpretation of expetience in our model.
Moïeover, the distinction between the two levels (or 'axes) in the model leads to
another observation. In late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the model was used
principally for propositìonal logic. This usage points to an important difference
between the two âxes, the contfâry and sub-contrary. While one (in our case the
'interpretatìon) affirms and negates 'universally', the other one (in our case
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'experience') affirms ând negates 'partially'.s In terms of Greimas, the first is 'neutral',
the second 'complex'. In our sociological use of the model, this means that the terms
of interpretation of experience (A and B) represent a'clear cut' meaning ascribed to
ftzzy experience @ and {). Since the actors ascribe 
- 
according to their habitus,
social position and interest 
- 
meaning to experience, they generâte clear concepts of
experienced social processes and structures that help them to shape their actions. This
is the case with any interpretation. Religious pr:axis, however, often operates with a
stark difference between experiential ând interpretational terms. This, precisely, is the
reasofl for its social power.6
Finally, the formal model can be read as emulating the concept of habitus, the
incorporated and creative generâtor of perception, judgement and action (Bourdieu
1980). The model operationalises the Bourdieuian theory for qualitative empirical
tesearch. Ideally, such research resrs upon slightly guided interwiews that give
interwiewees the chance to describe and interpret their praxis (tn a certain field). There
are, basically, only four necessary narraitve impulses. one focuses on negarive
experience such as problems and gtievances; the second on positive experience, for
instance, ofle's own posit-ion as a member of a reJigious movement or as a successful
individual; the third on inte¡pretation of negative experience, such as the reasons for a
crisis, adversity etc.; and the fourth on interpretation positive experience, for example,
iclcas for positive future developments, divine or human helpers etc. Such texts will
tlot <tnly disclose the basic structures of the habitus in question, but will most
¡rrol>ably also produce a huge surplus of signification, since the interviewees will
ttss()ciate mâny experiences and interptetations with each question. This pornts
tow¿rrcìs two tasks, one analytrcal and the other theoretical and methodical. As for the
ttntlysis of interviews, it is necessary to estabJish the logical con¡ection between signs
as well as the hierarchy of meaning within the texts. As for the larter, the analysis
focuses on paradigmatic reiations and can be carried out by Greimas' method of
isotope construction (Greimas 1995). The former focuses on syntâgmatic relations
and can be carried out by an analysis of basic logical junctions undedying the semantic
relations in sequences of text. The analytical operations of both steps cânnot be
shown here due to a lack of space þut see Schäfer 2003). Flowever, the analysis
points to the theoretical and methodical task of reconstructing wider relations of
meaning ftom the interviews. This corresponds to the theoretical notion of practical
logic as a Targe network of incorporated and practically operating dispositions of a
given habitus @ourdieu 1980). Before I sketch this extension of the basic square, I
would like to demonstrate the results of the appJication of our model to the concrete
intetcultural study of Pentecostals in the Guatemal.anwar.
s Äccording to the posit-ions ìn our first graph: Position Â means 'subject affirms predicate
universally', e.g. 'all pigr G) are pink þ)'; position B means 'subject negares preclicate
universally', e.g. 'no s are p'; position B means 'subject affirms predicare partially', e.g. 'some s
are p'; position A means 'subject negates predicate partially', e.g. 'some s are not p'.
6 The specific dynamics of religious practical logic cannot be discussed in this pâper; see
Schäfer 2004.
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3. Praxeological square 
- 
cultural contents
As shown above, the interview questions did not focus on religious content, such as
the 'image of God' held by people etc., but were formal and oriented toward the basic
logic of ascribing meaning to (whatever) negative and positive experience. Thus the
interviewees themselves made sense of their experiences while relating them.
Praxelogica I sq uarê: Neo-Pentecostals - modern¡z¡ng upper middle clasÊ
Ouest of power ciecicied
Level o{
expertênae
Pov/erof Gocl in the
Holy spirit (A)
Empowered
individuals (!lt rôruer tnrealênÊd
Actlon of
de¡nons {B}
Threatto
exteneion of
uppêr rn¡ddle
class power (A)
;denlity
Strategy
Diagram 4: Praxeological square: Neo-Pentecostalism
The most interesting result was that during the ongoing research, basically
according to contrastive sâmpling, two majot formations of religious habitus emerged:
one among interviewees of the modernizing upper-middle class and the other amonfl
intewiewees of the traditional lower class. Briefly, the fotmer could be called a h¿bitus
of charismatjc dominion over the wodd and the latter a habitus of apocalyptic escaPe
from the wotld. This hnding is important since it shows strong internal differences of
religious praxis within what is often treated as a homogeneous religious movement. lt-l
fact, the Pertecostal movement in Guatemala was quite uniform in terms of 'doctrinc'
until the early eighties; and even after that different strands of the movement maclc
use of â common repertoire of religious symbols. However, they have constructed a
different habitus out of these symbols, according to their social position, their habitus
of class, theit intetest, theit oppornrnities and theit consttaints.
A brief look at the Neo-Pentecostals in the upper-middle class shows a religious
practice revolving afound the quest for social powef (see axes). The experienced
threat to their power (through the guerrilla movemerìt, panmllttary fotces, economic
crisis and a loss of conttol over their personal lives) is countered by the power of the
t3
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Holy Spirit, constituting a ne\M religious identiry of empoweted individuals. These
individuals can combar the odginators of the threat, the demons. Thus, exotcism
turns out to be the central strategic pattern. The analysis of the whole network (see
below) shows that this pattern is being imposed on many fields of action and even
legitimatises Napalm bombings of Indian villages. As for the inteqplay between
experience and intetpretation, we see that the threatened social power (experience)
was restored by reìrgious interpretatìon, making reJigious 'symbols' become practical,
in the double meaning of the term.
Praxeologicalst¡uare: Classical Pentecostalisnr-lrcrtitional Iowel'cf ass
Level of
expenence I
D¡stontinuity of history
Rapture ol the
Church, relurn of
chríst (A)
Preparation for
the rapture (E)
End'tlmes:
certäÍnç ofth€
nearend (Bi
Loss of future,
rnisery, insecurity {A}
Õontin rity of hislcrT
ldenÌ¡ty'
Strolegy
Diagram 5: Praxeological square: Classical Pentecostalism
On the other hand, in the traditional parts of the lower class we find Classical
Pentecostal praxis constructed around the quest for survival ('history). People feel
that thev lack any possibility to shape their future due to poverry and fierce miltary
repression. They counter this situation with the promise of being removed by the
rapture from this wodd dunng the near second coming of Chtist. This hope results in
their new identity as a church in preparation for the râpture. From this position, the
explanation for their loss of opportututies becomes evident 
- 
during the apocalypse
everything necessarily changes for the worse. In such a situation, the strâtegy is a clear
break with political and social action and a withdrawal into the church 
- 
exactly the
strâtegy that under conditions of repression and misery allows for survival through in-
group solidarity. Thus, the religious interptetation of history (the break, see S axis)
turns out to be a tationale and strategy for an experiential continuity of history 
-
which, practically speaking, means survival.
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As for our interest in intercultural methods, we can state that it was preciseiy the
formality of the model that allowed the inter-viewees to reproduce their own
exPeriences and interpretative schemes, which, in the anal¡rsi5' resulted in the
emergence of two completely different sets of practical reJigious operators and, hnally,
habitus.
4. Network of practical operators
In the next step, we coflstfuct a network of operators through an analysis of the
syntagmatic-semânric relations. Thc praxeological square models the most important
cognitive operators of an¡, given actor.T Nevertheless, each of its terms has multiple
semantic relations to other concepts within the interwiew texts. These syntagmatic
hnks (mostly verbs and conjunctions) can be formalized to fit contrary, implicative or
contradictory relations. With additional quantitative weighting, this procedure allows
us to reconstruct many interconnected homological squares of secondary, tertiary etc.
importance. In the present pâper, this is onÌy to show that transformational logic,
reconstructed by our model, can be mulUpJied according to the subjacent 'deep
structure' (Greimas) of the inten'iews.
The example of Neo-Pentecostals in the upper-middle class shows, âmong other
things, that the centrâl strategic scheme of exotcism is being used in different fields of
p.^*ir. It is applied to lesser personal problems with an individual Christian as his/her
àwn exotcist. It also addresses grave personality distortions, which call for a special
minister as the exorcist. It can be applied to military conflict as well, with the
'Christian milttary' as the exorcist and the guerrillas or paramilitary forces as the
'demons'.
Such an extension of the basic model shows the broadet structure of the network
of operators which make up the practical logic of a given actor. Of coufse, such a
network is not complete and conclusive, but has blank spaces and oPen ends - iust as
the practical logic of human beings is not entirely coherent, does not know about
everything and is open to change and development. The '^ctoÍ'can be undefstood as
an individual or a collective. That is to sây, one can analyze a collective set of
interviews together or analyzs individual inten'iews and compare or superpose them
later, depending on one's feseafch interest. According to the theory, in any case,
habitus is to a cettain extent always individual and coll.ective. This meâns that the
network, fìnally, can be read as a model of dispositions of habitus, i.e. of a'structured
and structuring' generator of practice @outdieu). In this sense, it represents the
empirical basis for 
^ 
Ìheory of idenuty as a network' (Schäfer 2005a). However, since
habitus and field or social spâce never exist independent of one another, it is
7 This is assured by the intewiew technique and a quantitative element in quâlitative text-
anal¡.sis which cannot be cliscussed here. lt may only be highiighted that the analysis of
svntâgmatic relations furns semantic relations into the three basic logical relations mentioned
abgve ancl the relation of equivalencc. Thus it gives the parameters to construct a wider
network of practìcal cognitive operators. Ät this point, however, thc cliscussion about the
logical formalization of semantic relations cannot be addressed either.
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necessâry, in order to fully understand alien praxis, to relate the findings of the
interview analysis to the social positions of the actors. According to the research
interest, this can be done in relation to a specifìc fìeld of praxis (e.g. the reJigious
fìeld), to social space in general or to both. In the following, I focus briefly on soctal
space.
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Diagram 6: Network of practical operators
5. Social space of religious styles
The two habitus formations encountered, Classical and Neo-Pentecostals, are located
in different positions in the social space. Space is, according to Bourdieu (2000),
theoretically constructed. It is modelled as a coordinate sysrem by the implementation
of two different fotms of capital: economic (income) and cultural (education). The y-
axis (see Diagram 7) represents both forms of capital; actors with a high âmount of
either form of capital are ar rhe top; âctors with a low amount at the bottom. The x-
axis consists of the two forms of capital differentiated against one another; actors with
re/aÍiueþ more economic than cultural capital âre on the right, and those with relatively
more cultural capital on the left. Thus, in Guatemala, big landowners are positioned rn
the upper right while industrialists and managers are in the upper left, small peasanrs
in the lower right and skrlled labour in the iower left etc.
According to basic social data (income, possessions, education and profession 
-for teasons of research control), the interviewees can be located relatively well within
the model of social space. Thus, we carì observe that similar formations of habitus
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cluster in specifìc 
^reas 
of the social space 
- 
the Neo-Pentecostals in the upper right
and the Classical Pentecostals in the lower left. This last step allows for the
interpretation of networks of cognitive operators as þracrical operâtors, since it puts
them into their social context of 'use' SVittgenstein). It makes clear what level and
kind of social power, expectations, constrâints, opportunities etc. the different
religious perceptions, judgments and actions are associated with. It shows, for
example, that a power-broking religiosity such as the Neo-Pentecostal variant is
related to a social positions of relatiue þut not absolute) social power and combined
with perspectives of social ascent, but is being blocked by the old oligarchy. ,A.nd it
shows that apocalyptical religion that fosters withdrawal from the 'wodd' can be an
effective stfategy of survival in a situation in which the pohtical, military and
economic threats to survival âre over-whelming. As the model allows us to locate
religious actofs according to their social position, the coordinate system thus
transforms itself into a model of the social space of religious styles.
Social space of religious Syles
(habitus'f ormat ions)
Guatemala 1985
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Diagram 7: Social space of religious styles
It may, of course, be that the structuring of social spâce or of a ceftai¡ held of
practice follows other criteria than those of economic and cultural capital. Some mrght
sây that in traditional societies, tribes, or post-$/ar societies (ike Bosnia) social capital
is of more importance. If that is so, the relevant form of capital in such a setting can
be used to construct the apptopriate model. There are many good reasons to adhere
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1,,¡ ',¡"r¡r1( \\'.rI r)l nr(';r,uritrti t'r,)rì()rìri( iuì(l cLrltuf^l capital and to leave the fest to
',r Irrl:rrl1' trrr, r¡rrcr:rriorr,:ls rlr(' r('s(':rrclì ()l ()ur lljetefetd team8 i¡dicates.
It is ortly tlris l;rst sl('l) tlì1rt c?rr c()rnplete an intercultural study of religious
¡rr:tt'lit'r'. l't'r'r'ist'11, in rrn ulicll cultural and social setting, the motivation of sociat
llcti()lì, lrc it tlt'ivcn lry valucs, ends, affection, trâdition etc., cannot be understood
even ìn a basic sense without relating ìt to the social context in which it was genetated
and is being used. The work of relating habìtus and field or space, however, is the task
of the researcher's interpretative work.
6. Conclusion
It seems that â cenffal hermeneutical problem, the imposition of preconcepdons, can
fìnd,-up to a certain point, a methodical solution. A general solutiån 
- 
,o-L objective
standpoint 
- 
is not possible, since this would presuppose that human understanâing is
able to exit the hermeneutical circle (which would then be metaphysics). Intercultu'ral
social science, as I see it, ìs much more modest. NØe step outside the hcrmeneutical
circle of religious conrents by applying a formal merhod which gives the actors
observed the chance to provide their own content. We s¡ll have preãonceptions, but
these ate implicit in the formal, praxis-oriented method, not in any religious or cultural
content. $Øe simply presuppose that religron is praxis and we try to corìstruct a model,
as formal and general as possible, for the interviewees to fìll with the conteflt relevant
to tlteir practice. lle do not presuppose more than, fitst, that every person has
experiences that he or she values positively and others that he or she values negatively;
second, that, every person interprets such experiences in some wây, regurdlesi of the
sþs or symbols he or she mây use to do so; and, third, that every p.rcó., üves within
a social context, whatevet it may be.
My initial Lutheran 'Law vs. Gospel' scheme from my first field exploration
proved completely inl'ahd after studying Classical Penrecostal practice. Conttåry to my
fìrst assessment, the tetm 'authority' (instead of 'Law) had a very different use within
the network of religious operators. To obey authority in order to gain (!) one's own
salvation was, in the context of the impossibihty of any social action, a way of
obtairung new orientation and, evefl more importantly, of maintaining self-esteem and
dig-ty as a person appteciated by God. Precisely rhis was confitmed when I had the
chance to validate my fìndings and my methods during nine years of teaching in T,arrn
America, âmong others, Pentecostal srudenrs. Although the fìndings weie widely
âccepted, the method was everì more so. Some of my sftrdents *"r., ìn fact, looking
forward to appþing it to German Lutherans.
I Leif Seibert and Pattick Hahne on Bosnia, Jens Köhrsen on Argentina, and I{urr Salentin as
guest specialist for international quantitative research.
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